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This paper analyzes the size and the determinants of unexpected changes in EU countries' tax 
revenues and their impact on the ability of EU governments to use fiscal policy as a 
macroeconomic stabilisation device. We make use of information taken from the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes (SCP) setting countries' medium-term fiscal plans and focus on the 
period preceding the 2008/2009 global financial crisis. Tax revenue surprises are found to have 
fluctuated widely, alternating periods of sizeable windfalls and periods of substantial shortfalls.. 
When analysing the determinants of these unexpected changes in tax revenues, we find that GDP 
growth surprises and, in some cases (i.e. Ireland, Spain the UK and Finland) asset prices 
fluctuations have exerted the most significant influence. In the sequel we provide evidence on the 
incidence of these unexpected changes in governments' tax revenues on the ability of 
governments to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policies, which are desirable from a 
macroeconomic perspective. We find that countries that have experienced the largest tax revenue 
windfalls in the run-up to the 2008/2009 crisis have also tended to run more pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies although these results vary depending on the use of ex-post vs. real-time data and on the 
method used to calculate the cyclical position of the economy. Put differently, these results tend 
to indicate that while tax revenue windfalls may be good for the public purse during favourable 
times they may also (paradoxically) dwindle the ability of the countries concerned to run counter-
cyclical fiscal policies when cyclical conditions revert. 
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  11. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis has severely hit EU economies and has driven to a significant fall in 
governments' tax revenues which, together with the stimulus measures put in place under the 
European economic recovery Package (EERP), have led to a substantial deterioration in budgetary 
balances. While it is too early to devise a definitive picture on the total fiscal cost of the financial 
crisis, a number of important lessons can be drawn regarding the evolution of EU countries' 
budgetary balances before the 2008/2009 financial crisis. During the expansionary phase that 
preceded this crisis many EU governments' had benefited from large tax revenues windfalls 
allowing them to reach favourable budgetary positions.
2 This was especially the case of economies 
benefiting from dynamic internal demand and asset price appreciation such as Ireland and Spain, 
among others. While the surge of large tax revenues windfalls had a clear positive influence on 
fiscal positions till 2007, recent evolutions suggests that these countries had not exploited the full 
potential of these tax windfalls to run counter-cyclical fiscal policies and to contain further rise in 
public expenditure during good times which, with hindsight, proved to be unsustainable.
3 Such 
pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy during good times has in turn forced many EU governments 
to severe retrenchments once cyclical conditions reverted, thus driving to more pro-cyclicality 
during the 2008/2009 recession. The main lesson from these recent evolutions is that the advent 
of large tax revenue windfalls during periods of economic expansions may deteriorate the ability 
of governments to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy under less favourable circumstances. So 
far, the evidence on the magnitude of unexpected changes in tax revenues, their determinants 
and their influence on the pro-cyclicality nature of fiscal policy has been largely anecdotic, 
however. The goals of the this paper are therefore: (i) to provide a measure of the size of 
unexpected changes in tax revenues in the EU during the recent period and to analyse the 
determinants of these changes (ii) to investigate whether unexpected tax revenues variations have 
had an impact on the stabilisation property of fiscal policies in the EU. 
Using information about fiscal plans taken from the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCP) 
submitted by the EU Member States, tax revenue windfalls are found to have represented on 
average 0.21% of GDP in the EU during the period 1999-2008, hiding substantial variations both 
across time (0.36% in 1999-2001, -0.30% in 2002-2004, 0.41% in 2005-2007) and across countries 
(0.67% on average per year in Finland vs. -0.38% for Greece during the period 1999-2007).   
                                                 
2 See in particular European Commission (2008), Turrini (2008) and Morris and Schuknecht (2007).  
  2By contrast, the year 2008 has, in the wake of the global economic slowdown, translated into a 
shortfall equal to  -0.31% of GDP in the EU with countries such as Ireland (-4.3%), or Spain (-4.57%) 
being most heavily impacted.
 4 
Our analysis suggests that the main causes of these large swings in tax revenues in the EU seem to 
be the unexpected business cycle developments, in particular through composition effects related 
to changes in the tax bases and in some cases (such as in Spain and Ireland), can be linked to asset 
prices fluctuations. These unexpected tax revenue changes are, in turn, found to alter significantly 
the conduct of fiscal policies in EU countries and particularly so in the euro-area, as these policies 
appear to be more pro-cyclical during years following the occurrence of large tax revenue 
windfalls. Evidence for this is provided by estimating econometrically fiscal reaction functions. Our 
estimations suggest in particular that the effect of tax revenue surprises is not symmetrical over 
the business cycle: while tax revenue windfalls have a bearing on the pro-cyclical nature of fiscal 
policy, in turn, tax revenue shortfalls do not seem to alter the relationship between the fiscal 
stance and the business cycle. These results appear to be robust to alternative specification 
making of use of different methods to estimate the business cycle position and to alternative use 
of real-time and ex-post information. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a definition of government tax 
revenues' windfalls based on the use of the information contained in the EU Stability and 
convergence programmes and provides arguments regarding the relevance of this measure for 
fiscal surveillance. Section 3 provides estimates of the magnitude of governments' revenues 
windfalls in the EU during the period 1999-2008 while Section 4 analyses their determinants. 
Section 5 provides econometric evidence on the link between tax revenue windfalls and the 




                                                                                                                                                                  
3 Throughout the paper we will make use of the terms "unexpected changes in tax revenues", "tax revenue surprises" 
or "tax revenue windfalls/shortfalls" interchangeably, referring each time to the gap between forecast tax revenues 
made in year t-1 for year t. 
4 Weighted (GDP) average across EU countries. 
  32. Definition of unexpected change in tax revenues and relevance for fiscal surveillance 
Loosely speaking, the expression "unexpected changes in tax revenues", is meant to capture a 
higher (lower) amount of actually observed revenue compared to a certain benchmark. Since 
there is no clear-cut definition of such benchmark in the specialised literature, the definition and 
measurement of tax revenue surprises itself may vary. In this paper we make use of the 
information contained in the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCP) in order to derive a 
measure of revenue windfalls/shortfalls. In particular we use governments’ revenue projections 
included in the SCP as our benchmark. Since these projections are likely to fully embed both 
expected business cycle developments and ex-ante plans of national governments (i.e. the impact 
of recently legislated discretionary measures), the discrepancies between them and the actual 
revenue outcomes provide a simple and straightforward measure of the revenue 
windfalls/shortfalls. This definition is thus meant to capture the extent of the Government’s tax 
revenue surprise, either good (windfalls) or bad (shortfalls). Fiscal data reported in the SCPs are 
also intended to reflect the design of a fiscal strategy for the medium term. Therefore, 
discrepancies between plans and actual outcomes might reflect the extent to which surprises in 
tax revenues are likely to alter the conduct of fiscal policy over the business cycle. The use of such 
fiscal plans announcement and their comparison with ex-post outcome has been used by a 
number of authors in the fiscal policy literature, see for instance Forni and Momigliano (2005) and 
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2008). To this regard, it is important to note that this conduct may not 
have as primary objective to counter unfavourable or favourable cyclical evolutions, however. Put 
differently, even in the absence of tax revenues surprises, either good or bad, fiscal policy may 
indeed reflect objectives different from the need to conduct stabilising macroeconomic policies. 
However, independently of the overall fiscal policy strategy, a better identification of tax revenue 
surprises may help determining whether countries that have experienced more of such windfalls 
(or shortfall) are less likely to run counter-cyclical fiscal policy compared to countries with lower 
revenues windfalls (shortfalls). In formulas, our definition of tax revenue surprise can be expressed 
as it follows: 
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The definition provided in (1) is straightforward if one is to measure unexpected tax revenues 
gains or losses. However, other approaches and definitions can be found in the literature. The 
European system of central banks (ESCB), for example, developed the so-called disaggregated 
approach and focuses on the concept of "unexplained" (in contrast with "unexpected") revenues 
changes. Basically, in the ESCB disaggregated framework unexplained changes in tax revenue can 
be defined as the difference between the actual annual change in revenue-to-GDP ratio and the 
one that would be predicted (benchmark) when accounting for the impact of discretionary 
measures, changes in the tax bases and fiscal drag.
6 To the extent that the changes in these 
various ex-ante factors reflect the expected overall tax revenues changes as included in the SCPs, 
then the two measures should provide similar proxies. They could differ, however, for at least two 
reasons: (i) the assessment of the impact of discretionary measures; (ii) the different timing: in the 
ESCB disaggregated approach every information available (even ex-post) is used as explanatory 
factor of the revenue change, whereas projections included in the SCPs only embed information 
available at the moment the programme is submitted. The use of up to date information may 
reduce the degree of uncertainty regarding ex-post revenues development and thus yield lower 
estimates for the revenues' windfalls/shortfalls. Overall, it emerges that revenue 
windfall/shortfalls is a relative concept, as it depends on the degree of knowledge embedded in 
the benchmark, to which we compare the actual revenue outcome. 
 
A potential weakness of our measure of unexpected revenue changes concerns the 
implementation of additional discretionary measures by the Government after the submission of 
the SCP. Clearly this is a relevant problem for what concerns projections in t-1 for years t+1 and 
t+2, as governments often revise their fiscal plans. This is the reason why we do not include in our 
dataset of revenue surprises the observations concerning the differences between revenue 
outcome in years t+1 and t+2 and projections for years t+1 and t+2 made at the end of year t-1. 
This problem is of less concern in the case of the differences between outcome in t and projection 
                                                 
5 SCPs are usually submitted between the end of November of year t-1 and January of year t. 
  5for year t made in year t-1, which is the focus of this paper. The reason is that usually discretionary 
measures passed in year t and having effect on the same year tend to be small in size and, in any 
case, one should always take into account the time lag usually required for fiscal measure to have 
effects. This said, we acknowledge that this remain in few cases a limitation of our measure. 
Another potential limitation is that the fiscal plans included in the SCPs are likely to be influence 
by political bias and willingness of governments to provide optimistic projections. By choosing to 
use the SCP as information source we therefore implicitly assume that this political bias is part of 
the revenue windfalls/shortfalls. On the one hand this bias becomes relatively important as for 
instance in years preceding general elections then our estimates of revenue windfall might also be 
biased. On the other hand, this political bias may also have a permanent effect and features the 
characteristics of countries which persistently tend to provide overly optimistic projections. These 
different possibilities are considered in the sequel.  
 
3. Unexpected changes in tax revenues in the EU: how important are they? 
 
Graph 1 depicts the evolution of the average of tax revenue surprises for the EU15 countries, the 
euro-area (which is represented by the EU15 excepting Denmark, Sweden and the UK) and the 
recently acceded Member States (RAMS) for the period 1999-2008, using the definition given in 
(1)
7. Given that the SCPs for the RAMS only started to be submitted in 2004, the observations for 
these countries only start in 2005. Revenue windfalls appear to have been relatively large on 
average in the EU15 in 1999 (where they were equal to 0.8% of GDP) as well as in 2005 and 2006 
(0.7% of GDP on average). During this latter two years revenues windfalls appear to be even more 
pronounced for the euro-area (0.8% of GDP for 1999 and 2005-2006). The relatively large revenue 
windfalls in the latter period are even more pronounced for the RAMS reaching 0.9 and 1.3 % of 
GDP in 2006 and 2007 respectively. The year 2008 has witnessed a sharp fall in EU countries' tax 
revenues with, as a consequence, large slippages from fiscal plans submitted in the SCPs of 
autumn 2007 which were especially pronounced in euro area (-0.7% of GDP).  
 
It becomes clear that the evolutions of the revenue windfalls match the overall evolution in the 
business cycle. The period 1999-2008 can be divided into four sub-periodsaccording to the 
prevalence (on average) of revenue windfalls during the early years 1999-2001 and the years 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 See Kremer, et al., (2006). 
7 Weighted (GDP) averages. 
  62005-2007 and the period in-between, i.e. 2002-2004, where on average the EU has experienced 
revenue shortfalls and finally the year 2008 where big shortfalls have been experienced in the 
wake of the global financial crisis. Despite the relatively homogeneity of these different sub-
period, country-level experiences have sometimes been rather disperse, however. Table 1 
provides country-level information on the average value of the revenue windfalls for these three 
periods and the average (weighted using GDP levels) figures for the relevant country groups. This 
is evidenced by the last three rows of Table 1 showing that the standard deviation of revenues 
windfalls/shortfalls was always superior to the average figures suggesting that countries' 
experiences across countries have differed widely. In the earlier period 1999-2001 some countries 
such as Luxembourg, Germany, or the Netherlands have benefited from substantial revenue 
windfalls while other countries such as Denmark or Portugal have experienced rather important 
revenue shortfalls. On the contrary, during the years 2002-2004 when revenues windfalls have 
turned to shortfalls in most countries (of around -0.29% of GDP in the EU15), some countries such 
as Finland, Denmark, Sweden, or Ireland have instead obtained substantial revenues windfalls. 
During the years 2005-2007, the average revenue windfalls have been the largest representing 
0.40 % GDP in the EU15 (0.66 % for the RAMS). During this latter period, again, experiences have 
been rather diverse with counties like Cyprus, Hungary, Sweden, Spain, Ireland and Portugal 
experiencing above 1% point of GDP revenue windfalls while other countries such as Latvia, Malta, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Greece experiencing revenue shortfalls. The biggest shortfalls following the 
occurrence of the global financial crisis in 2008 have been experienced in Ireland (-4.30%), Spain (-
4.57%) and the Baltic States: Estonia (-4.89%), Latvia (-5.08%), Lithuania (-1.98%) while still some 
countries, such as Sweden (3.41%), Luxembourg (2.06%), Slovenia (1.51%) or the UK (0.95%) 
experienced tax revenue windfalls as a result of past tax revenues surprises not et reflecting the 
sharp deterioration of business cycle conditions which manifested itself more clearly towards the 
last quarter of 2008. 
 
4. The determinants of tax revenues surprises 
The first potential culprit for the existence of these large revenue windfalls/shortfalls is of course 
the business cycle.
8 During periods of expansion, buoyant economic activity increases tax 
                                                 
8 Note that the variation of tax elasticities could also play a role. These variations are not considered here and can be 
thought as already being accounted for in our measure of revenue windfalls. For instance governments use tax 
elasticities ex-ante to determine their expected tax revenues. If the ex-post tax elasticity varies from its ex-ante 
forecast, then the final tax yield could differ from the forecasted figure even in case where tax bases and GDP growth 
were perfectly forecasted. Using our definition of revenue windfall does not allow to further decompose the tax 
  7revenues with unchanged taxation rates if tax yields respond more than proportionally to positive 
changes in economic activities, i.e., if tax elasticities rise above their normal value. On the 
contrary, during periods of slowdown, tax yield may contract more than proportionally compared 
to GDP growth rates and thus drive to lower tax yields. Other (than business cycles) factors could 
explain the existence of revenue windfalls/shortfalls. For instance, governments can depart from 
their initial budgetary forecasts by either increasing or decreasing taxation levels or introducing 
changes affecting the level of tax collection such as the existence of indexation mechanisms, the 
use of one-off measures or because developments beyond the direct influence of national 
governments may take place such as increases in international oil prices or significant asset prices 
changes. However, given that our measure of revenue windfall/shortfalls is represented by the 
unexpected changes in tax revenues at t-1, it is likely that most of these elements may have only a 
limited influence. Following our definition of revenue windfall/shortfalls, these tax revenues 
surprises, either positive or negative, should mainly reflect surprises in terms of business cycle 
evolutions. Indeed, the elements previously mentioned, do also depend on the evolution of the 
business cycle. It is thus natural to first compare the evolution of revenue windfall/shortfall with 
business cycles developments and later investigate whether other-than business cycle changes 
have had an influence on revenue windfalls (shortfalls). 
 
In order to single-out the role played by business cycle evolution, we consider separately the 
changes of tax revenue levels (i.e. no longer as percentage of GDP) and their link with changes in 
business cycle conditions. Given that governments GDP growth forecasts errors are likely to play a 
role, we calculate an indicator for the growth surprise similar to the indicator of revenue windfall 
by making use of the information contained in the SCPs regarding GDP growth forecasts made by 
national governments in year t-1. The growth surprise (measure in %-point of GDP) is thus equal 
to: 
 





t t GDP 1 , − Δ
 
Where   is the annual percentage change in nominal GDP forecasted at t-1 and made for 
the year t and  is the percentage change in nominal GDP that has effectively taken 
place at t. As for government revenues, we take the forecast for year t made in year t-1 and 
SCP





                                                                                                                                                                  
revenue windfalls given that only information on the expected governments revenues is available without further 
  8calculate the difference between this figure and the ex-post GDP growth figure taken from the 
Spring 2009 Ameco database which in turn represent the ex-post value of the annual GDP growth 
at year t. Note that nominal rather than real GDP figures are considered in order to account for 
the influence of inflation developments. We thus link the forecast error in terms of GDP growth as 
described in (2) with the forecast error in terms of tax revenues as defined below: 





t t level R 1 , _ − Δ
Graph 2 displays the evolution of tax revenue surprises expressed as the difference as defined in 
(3) together with the value of growth surprise as defined in equation (2) for each EU15 country 
considered individually.
9 Graph 2 shows that great variations in tax revenue surprises have taken 
place in EU15 countries and that, overall these variations have closely followed (nominal) GDP 
growth surprises. Interestingly, the surprises on the side of government tax revenues are in 
general less pronounced than the surprises concerning the growth outcomes. The gap between 
growth surprises and tax revenues surprises thus indicates than other-than-growth factors may 
play a role in determining tax revenue windfalls/shortfalls. In order to further investigate the 
potential determinants of tax revenues surprises we estimate econometrically the following 
equation: 
 
Tax revenue surprise in leveli,t  = β0 + β1 growth surprise i,t + αi + εi,t     (4) 
 
where βs are the coefficients to be estimated, αi is a country-specific constant and εi,t is an error 
term which is assumed to have the usual (i.i.d.) properties. The coefficient αi is of particular 
importance as it represents country-effect which may affect the relationship between government 
tax revenue surprises and business cycle developments. For instance, some countries may 
systematically under-estimate their future tax revenues if an expansionary cycle is expected to 
reverse soon. Government may also announce lower taxation rate for political reasons such that 
the taxation forecast always fall short of the true taxation levels. These unobserved effects can 
reasonably be considered as having a permanent influence on the relationship between revenue 
windfalls and the business cycles, especially during a relatively short time period as this is the case 
here. Fixed-effect OLS estimators can thus be used in order to remove the influence of (time 
invariant) country-specific features embodied in the term αi. An estimation of equation (4) can 
thus provide a predicted value of the revenue windfall controlling for country-specific effects 
                                                                                                                                                                  
details on tax elasticities. 
9 The RAMS are not considered in detail as these countries only have three years of observations. 
  9which may affect the relationship between revenue windfalls and growth surprises. The predicted 
values for the variable Tax revenue surprise in leveli,t  can  be obtained after estimating (4) and can 
be considered as the estimated revenue windfalls net of the influence of the business cycle (i.e. 
the growth surprise) and unobserved country-specific effects. The evolution of these "net" tax 
revenue surprises are reported in Graph 3 for the EU15 countries. Interestingly, controlling for the 
influence of the business cycle and country-specific effect indeed appears to lower substantially 
both the size and variability of the revenue windfalls. This result suggests that these two elements 
play a major role in determining the size and variability of tax revenues surprises. A more general 
analysis of the determinants of revenues windfalls can be undertaken including other potential 
determinants to the equation (4). These determinants are: 
 
- A composition effect measuring the effect of change in the composition of GDP growth. For an 
unchanged rate of GDP growth, tax revenues can change depending on the composition of GDP 
growth if, for instance, GDP growth is driven by tax-poor rather than by tax-rich GDP components. 
The growth rates of each tax basis can thus be compared to the overall GDP growth rate in order 
to investigate whether GDP growth composition is likely to influence tax yields. The following 





















Taxbase          ( 4 )  
 
where the tax bases considered are considered at t-1 and includes private consumption (for 
indirect consumption taxation), the gross operating surplus (as proxy of the tax bases for profit 
taxation) and the total wage bill (for wages and social security expenditures). These different tax 
bases are added-up in (4) in order to obtain an aggregate measure of the influence of the 
composition effect. The data used to calculate (4) is taken from Ameco. 
 
- Asset prices development including the stock market and housing market may also play a role in 
explaining revenue windfalls given that taxation of capital revenues and transactions in housing 
market (VAT and/or stamp duty) can significantly influence tax revenues, especially during periods 
of fast prices (de-)increases. The variables used are the annual change in equity prices and housing 
prices are taken from the Bank of International Settlements database. It must be noted that this 
                                                 
10 See PFR 2008 for further details on the construction of the indicator on composition effects used here. 
  10data only contains information for Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK such that estimations using this information could yield 
results different from the overall EU25 sample. 
- Finally the effect of trade balance can be investigated separately by calculating the annual 
change in the deficit/surplus in total international trade (including intra-EU trade) in percentage of 
GDP of each country. The data used is taken from Ameco. 
 
The influence of these different determinants are considered in Table 2 which provides the 
estimations of equation (4) extended by including the variables listed above and using fixed effect 
estimation technique in order to control for non-observed country-specific effects.
11 
The first column of Table 2 provides the results of the estimation using only the growth surprise as 
explanatory variable. This variable appears to be positively related to the tax revenue surprise 
variable and is highly statistically significant. The results depicted in Graph 2 are thus confirmed by 
this econometric estimation since revenue windfalls appear to be explained to a large extent by 
the growth surprise. Column (ii) of Table 2 includes the measure of the composition effects given 
by (4) into the equation estimated. This variable does not appear to be statistically significant, 
however. A possible explanation for this result is that the effects of GDP composition on revenue 
windfall/shortfall is already accounted for in the growth surprise. Indeed, the growth surprise may 
itself be due to composition effects such that it is difficult to identify the influence of the 
composition effect separately from the growth surprise. In order to provide an estimate of the link 
between growth surprises and composition effects, we have calculated an interaction term 
between both variables (by multiplying them) and included this new variable into the equation 
estimated while dropping the composition effect variable in order to avoid co-linearity. The result 
of this estimation is shown in column (iii). This interaction term, which is intended to capture the 
influence of the composition effects on the revenue windfalls through growth surprises, appears 
to be positive and statistically significant suggesting that composition effects have indeed played 
an important role in explaining revenues windfalls/shortfalls in the EU25 during the period 
considered, although only to the extent that these compositions effects have led to large growth 
surprises. In the sequel we include other explanatory variables such as equity and residential 
prices and trade balance. It must be noted however that most of these other variables are only 
available for a sub-sample of EU15 countries (the number of countries covered is now 11 against 
                                                 
11 All regressions also include non-reported year-specific effects. 
  1125 in Column (i)). We thus re-estimated the coefficient on the growth surprise variable for this 
sub-sample of countries to check whether the general result concerning the relationship between 
tax revenue surprises and growth-surprises holds for this sub-sample of countries. Column (iv) 
indicates that this is indeed the case although the coefficient appears to be half the level of the 
one for the EU25, suggesting that EU15 countries tax revenues are less sensitive to growth 
surprises.
12 Column (v) thus further adds to the estimated equation the effect of the other 
variables namely the annual change in the trade balance (as measured by the net trade balance in 
percentage of GDP), the annual change in residential prices and the annual change in equity 
prices. These estimations show that residential prices and the trade balance do not seem to 
explain much of the variation in tax revenue surprises although equity prices increases appear to 
affect positively tax revenue surprises. The result concerning residential prices appears at first 
glance rather puzzling given that recent revenues windfalls have often been associated with 
booming tax revenues related to asset prices, see in particular Morris and Schuknecht (2007) and 
Hilbers et al. (2008) for recent evidence.  Two remarks must be made with regards to this result. 
First, as noted above, the length of the panel (i.e. 1999-2008) might be too short to properly 
capture the impact of asset price changes. These price changes have in particular been especially 
important in some EU15 countries such as the UK, Spain or Ireland and not so much in the recently 
acceded Member States. Second, changes in asset prices can also influence economic growth and 
consumption in particular through wealth effects. For instance, Mohr and Morris (2007) who 
undertake a similar exercise although with different methodology and less countries, find that 
changes in stock market prices have played a positive and significant role in favouring the 
emergence of large government revenues windfalls.  Martinez-Mongay et al. (2007) further 
showed that a large part of extra-tax revenues Spain benefited from during the expansionary 
period 1995-2006 was linked to asset price increase, in particular house prices. These authors also 
suggested (rightly so with hindsight) that most of these extra tax revenues would vanish should 
the expansionary phase suffer sudden stop as this would be the case with the 2008/2009 global 
financial crisis. Third, residential and equity prices appear to be positively correlated such that 
including both variables in the same regression can entail multicolinearity problems. More 
generally, the estimates provided above represents only an average effect across countries. A 
detailed inspection of the evolution of asset prices reveals that, during the period considered, 
Ireland, Spain, the UK (for both asset prices) and Finland (in particular for equity prices) 
                                                 
12 This assertion is confirmed by (unreported) estimation of column (i) equation for recently acceded Member States 
only suggesting as the coefficient of the growth suprise variable equals 0.550 and significant at 1%. 
  12experienced particularly sharp price increases. A way to test whether these evolutions had any 
significant impact on tax revenue surprises and to avoid colinearity issues is to interact a dummy 
variable equal to one for these four countries with the evolution of an asset prices indicator 
(which is just the average residential and equity price indices). The results of estimating this new 
variable are displayed in Column (vi) and 6 of Table 2. The coefficient obtained on the interaction 
between the country dummy variable (which is equal to one for Ireland, Spain, the UK and Finland) 
and the asset prices indicators appears to be positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
for these countries  recent sharp boom in asset prices have had a positive and significant influence 
on tax revenue surprises. The coefficient estimate for the asset price variable alone is insignificant, 
however, suggesting that the influence of asset prices evolution on tax receipt was only limited to 
certain countries. 
 
5. Evidence on the link between unexpected changes in tax revenues and the stabilisation 
function of fiscal policy 
 
As shown earlier, EU governments' revenue windfalls have been sizeable during the period 
preceding the financial crisis, averaging 0.41% of GDP in the EU25 during the years 2005-2007, and 
have been followed by sharp deterioration in EU countries public budget with, on average, a tax 
revenue shortfall amounting to -0.3% of GDP in 2008, with wide variations across country groups 
as indicated in Table 1. The fact that growth surprises seem to explain the largest part of these 
unexpected changes in tax revenues is particularly revealing for the analysis of the consequences 
of tax revenue surprises on the counter-cyclicality property of fiscal policy. Given that unexpected 
growth developments lead to unexpected change in tax revenues, this is likely to alter the conduct 
of counter-fiscal policy in real-time. For instance during phases of positive growth surprises, 
governments could use these unexpected revenues to increase expenditure (or reduce taxation) 
beyond what would be otherwise advisable from a medium-term perspective. In the following 
downward phase of the cycle, revenue shortfalls could mean that tax revenues are insufficient to 
meet the planned increased expenditure and drive to deterioration of fiscal positions. 
These questions are investigated in a simple manner here following the usual approach making 
use of fiscal reaction functions where annual change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB) are related to past developments in the business cycles and the CAPB and the debt level.
13 
Business cycles evolutions are measured through the output gap which is used in the context of 
  13the EU fiscal surveillance framework (see Denis et al. (2007). Graph 4 plots the average values of 
the annual change in the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) across countries and years according to 
two variables: the value of the output gap in year t-1, which indicates the position of a given 
country in the cycle and the value of the revenue windfall (shortfall) as calculated in (1) for the 
year t-1 assuming that the impact of revenue slippages on the fiscal stance do have a lagged 
effect.
14 The grouping in terms of windfall/shortfall is determined by splitting the whole set of 
observations across countries and years into three groups according to the values taken by the 
revenue windfall (shortfall) expressed in percentage of GDP.
15 
 
According to Graph 4, a positive and large change in the CAB in year t has usually been associated 
with periods of negative output gaps and of large revenue windfalls in year t-1. However, during 
expansionary periods (i.e. OG>0), the average change in the CAB does not appear to be very 
different from the one prevailing during periods of revenues shortfall or neutral revenues 
surprises. The evidence for the EU25 thus seems support only partially the idea expressed above 
according to which the occurrence of large revenue windfalls has a strong bearing on the counter-
cyclicality of fiscal policy. It is important to note that the data used to construct the Graph 4 
concerns the EU25 as a whole and thus include both EU15 countries for which data are rather 
complete for the period 1999-2007 and the recently acceded Member States (RAMS) for which the 
data are only available starting in 2005 onward. Graph 5 and Graph 6 instead perform the same 
calculation as for Graph 4 but considering only the EU15 and euro-area MS in order to get a more 
time-consistent picture of the influence of revenue windfall on the counter-cyclical nature of fiscal 
policy. 
 
The results depicted in Graph 5 are more conclusive than the ones of Graph 5. As before the 
annual change in the CAB appears to be positive and large in absolute term (+1%) during periods 
of negative output gaps. Now, in addition, the decrease in the CAB appears to be negative on 
average and large in absolute terms (-0.4%) during periods of positive output gap.  These results 
would thus tend to confirm that revenues windfalls do promote pro-cyclical fiscal policies. It must 
be said, however, that the annual change in the CAB is rather similar in the case of large revenue 
windfalls to the case of neutral change in governments' revenues during periods of expansion. A 
                                                                                                                                                                  
13 See in particular, European Commission (2006). 
14 Such an approach is similar to the one taken in the European Commission's Public Finances Report (2006) to 
measure the counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy. 
  14similar exercise in carried out for the euro-area countries and results are reported in Graph 6. Here 
the differences in the CAB between periods of large windfalls is even more pronounced compared 
to the previous case: the annual average change in the CAB is equal to 1.3% during periods of large 
revenue windfalls and positive output gap and to -0.6% during periods of large revenue windfall 
but negative output gaps. These figures are also markedly different from the cases where the 
surprises in government revenue changes are either negative (shortfall) or not very different from 
0 (neutral). 
 
In the sequel we provide econometric analysis of the possibility for revenues surprises to influence 
the pro-cyclical nature of fiscal policy in the EU15. The Member States that entered the EU after 
May 2004 are not considered given that only two years are available on the revenue windfall 
variable for these countries which is insufficient to provide valuable information on business cycle 
evolutions in these countries. In order to investigate the influence of revenue windfalls on the 
stabilisation properties of fiscal policies, we estimate the fiscal reaction function for the EU15 
countries. These fiscal reaction functions have been widely used in the fiscal policy literature in 
particular in order to assess the counter-cyclicality nature of fiscal policy where the fiscal stance is 
related to an indicator of the cyclical position of the economy, see for instance, European 
Commission (2006). As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable is the annual change of the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (ΔCAPBt) expressed in percentage of GDP and is assumed to 
depend on initial budgetary positions represented by the lagged (one year) of the cyclically 
adjusted balance (CABt-1) and the lagged level of the debt to GDP ratio (Bt-1). In addition to the 
fiscal policy variables we also include the lagged output gap measuring the cyclical position of the 
economy (OGt-1).
16 The equation tested is indicated below, each variable being indexed by i, the 
country-specific subscript: 
 
ΔCAPBi,t = β0 + β1 CAPBi,t-1 + β2 Bi,t-1 + β3 OGi,t-1 + αi,t + εi,t       (5) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
15 More specifically, the revenue windfall group if defined as those value where the revenue surprise is greater than 
1% of GDP, the revenue shortfall includes the revenue surprises lower than -0.5% of GDP and the neutral revenue 
surprises are those values that lie between the first two groups. 
16 The existing literature has also considered other explanatory variables that could influence the fiscal stance in order 
to control for the institutional setting, the level of government decentralisation, the occurrence of elections, etc. In 
the current paper we do not consider these other potential determinants due to the short time span and low number 
of observations available which strongly limit the degree of freedom of the estimation reported here. Given that we 
control for country-fixed effect, elements relating to the institutional setting or level of government decentralisation 
  15Our prior expectations are that a higher deficit level at t-1 (i.e. negative value of CABi,t-1) and debt 
level induce governments to tighten their fiscal stance thus β1 is expected to display a negative 
value while β2 is expected to display a positive sign. The main variable of interest in (5) is the 
output gap OGi,t-1. Here we make use of the output gap estimated by the European Commission, 
see in particular Denis et al.(2007). Alternatively, we will also consider the output gap estimates 
making use of the Hodrick Prescott filter (thereafter HP) to calculate the growth potential and also 
provided by the European Commission. The fiscal stance in a given country is said to be pro-
cyclical if during periods of expansions (i.e. positive output gap) the fiscal position of this country 
deteriorates and if during periods of contractions (i.e. negative output gap) it improves. The terms 
εi,t and αi,t represent an idiosyncratic error term and a country-specific fixed effect respectively. 
The country-specific effect is taken care of using within-panel estimations are before. 
 
All variables in (5) are constructed using the latest available information at the time this paper was 
written, i.e. using the Autumn 2009 DG Ecfin forecast. Given that the latest year of observation is 
2008, the variables used are therefore considered ex-post. Importantly in this respect, a number 
of papers have advocated for the use of real-time rather than ex-post data to assess the extent to 
which fiscal policy is counter or pro-cyclical by analogy to the analysis carried out by Orphanides 
(2001) for the analysis of monetary policy stance. The reason for using real-time data in the fiscal 
policy context is that this data is more likely to reflect the intentions of national governments with 
respect to the fiscal stance and, eventually, may indicate the intention by fiscal authorities to use 
fiscal policy as macroeconomic stabilisation tool. A problem with the use of real-time data for 
assessing the business cycle using the information included in the SCPs however is that one may is 
that these may be subject to political bias (e.g. government making over-optimistic assumption for 
future growth in order to justify increased spending). As an alternative, a number of authors have 
resorted to use international institutions' fiscal projections instead which are less prone to suffer 
from political bias. For instance, Forni and Momigliano (2005) make use of real-time OECD 
projections on the output gap to assess the counter-cyclicality of OECD countries fiscal policies 
advocating that the political bias is less binding. However, in our case we are mostly interested to 
analyse the intentions of fiscal policy makers, the political bias issue is less of an inconvenient to 
the extent that we consider it as part of the national fiscal strategy announced ex-ante. In a recent 
paper Cimadomo (2008) also advocated that the use of real-time data for the fiscal projections 
                                                                                                                                                                  
for instance, which can be considered to vary little over time, are also unlikely to influence our result in a significant 
way. 
  16given that ex-post figures are likely to be biased as well. This author suggests in particular that 
measurement errors in both the dependent variable (i.e. ΔCAPB) and explanatory variables (i.e. 
OG) may blur the assessment of the intended stance of fiscal policy with respect to the business 
cycle. Indeed, Cimadomo (2008) finds that fiscal policies have tend to be pro-cyclical using ex-post 
data period while the use of real time figures suggest instead that these policies were intended to 
be counter-cyclical. Following Forni and Momigliano (2005) and Cimadomo (2008) we thus also 
tried out alternative specifications using real-time figures on the output gap and the CAPB using 
different vintages of the Ameco database as released in autumn each year. 
 
Table 3 provides the estimates of equation (5) for the EU15 countries for alternative specification 
using real-time and ex-post variables as indicated above:
17 
 
•  Columns (i)-(ii) use as dependent variable ΔCAPB (and the lagged value of CAB) ex-post the 
ex-post output gap estimates making use of the production function method (thereafter 
FP) and the Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter alternatively to calculate the output gap (all 
variables are constructed using the Autumn 2009 DG ECFIN forecast data) 
•  Columns (iii)-(iv) also use as dependent variable ΔCAPB (and the lagged value of CAB)  ex-
post but use real-time information to calculate the output gap using the HP and PF 
methods alternatively (using the different Autumn vintage of the Ameco database, DG 
Ecfin).
 18 
•  Columns (v-vi) use real-time information for both ΔCAPB (and the lagged value of CAB) and 
the output gap using the HP and PF methods alternatively 
The results displayed in Table 3 show coefficients in accordance with prior expectations: the 
annual change in the CAB is positively correlated with the initial debt level and negatively 
correlated with the initial budgetary position. The sign of the coefficient β3 concerning the output 
gap varies depending on whether on whether real-time or ex-post data are considered and also on 
whether HP or PF methods are used to determine the potential growth level. This coefficient is 
                                                 
17 In addition to the explanatory variables listed below, we also controlled for indicator of fiscal governance on 
expenditure rules, which are deemed to influence the pro-cyclical nature of fiscal policy (see in particular Debrun et 
al., 2008), the output gap of the EU15 and the differential of the output gap in each country with respect to the output 
of the EU15 as whole in order to capture the possible influence of EU-wide cyclical position  and a dummy variable 
indicating whether general elections took place during the same or preceding year. The coefficients of these variables, 
although included in all specification were not reported in Table 3 and 4 to simplify the presentation. 
18 Because old Ameco vintages are only available starting in 2000 when using hte HP method and 2002 when using the 
production function framework, the number of observations was also lower when using real-time information on the 
output gap and the CAPB as indicated in Table 4. 
  17insignificant In all but one case, however (as shown in Column (v), when using real-time CAB and 
OG using the HP method) such that it is difficult to derive conclusions regarding the pro-cyclical (or 
counter) cyclical nature of the fiscal stance taking these estimations at face value. 
 
We now consider more closely the potential influence of tax revenue surprises on the coefficient 
obtained for the output gap in estimating equation (5). Factual evidence mentioned earlier 
suggests that in Europe fiscal policies have tended to be pro-cyclical in the wake of large revenue 
windfalls and has thus tended to impair the ability of EU governments to run counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy.  Accordingly the occurrence of large revenue windfalls would tend to alter the value of the 
coefficient β3 in equation (5). In order to investigate the possibility that tax revenue surprises 
influence the relationship between the output gap and the annual variation in the CAB, we 
consider the interaction between the one-year lag of our measure of revenue windfall as 
described in (1) and the lagged output gap using the four methods. One must note that, in order 
to derive a meaningful interaction between tax revenues surprises and the OG variable, one also 
needs to standardise the variables being interacted in order to possibly interpret the results in 
terms of tax revenue windfalls, shortfalls and neutral as done in Graphs 4-7. Ideally one would like 
to compare the coefficients obtained for separate sample corresponding to these three possible 
scenarios. However, the low number of observations available prevents us to do so. An alternative 
is to use the simple approach described Aitken and West (1991) by centering the variables around 
their mean such that results interpreted depending on the values taken by the conditioning 
variable, i.e., in our case, the level of tax revenue surprises at t-1 (Annex 1 provides more details 
on this method). This simple method therefore allows us to estimate three different slope 
coefficients for the output gap variable according to whether the revenue surprise variable is set 
at the mean value (neutral revenue surprise), at +1 standard deviation (revenue windfall) or at -1 
standard deviation (revenue shortfall) of the revenue surprise. 
 
Table 4 provides the results of this exercise for the four different measures of the output gaps and 
of the CAPB (i.e. ex-post, real-time, using the PF and HP method) and for alternative benchmarks 
of the level of tax revenue surprises (i.e. windfalls, shortfalls and neutral tax revenue surprise). The 
results in Table 4 indicate the elasticity of ΔCAPBi,t with respect to OGi,t-1 for given values of, 
respectively 0.9% and 1.8% of revenue windfall in percentage of GDP as calculated in (1) and 
corresponding to one and two standard deviation of the revenue surprise. The calculation of the 
corresponding standard deviation of these estimated is described in Annex 1. The results displayed 
  18in Table 4 show that the elasticities have different signs depending on the specification considered 
and when revenue shortfalls or neutral revenue surprises are considered. The coefficient on the 
interaction of the revenue surprise and the output gap is always negative in the case where tas 
revenue windfalls arise in preceding year, excepting when using CAPB and OG in real-time with the 
PF method. This result suggests that tax revenue windfalls tend to promote a pro-cyclical fiscal 
stance in all specifications. It must be noted, however that the interaction of the revenue windfall 
with the output gap for the case where revenue surprises are considered are only significant in a 
number of cases: when using the OG and CAB ex-post, when using the OG in real-time but only 
with the HP method and when using the OG and CAB in real-time but only when using the HP 
method. It must be noted in addition that in some case neutral tax revenue changes appear to 
favour pro-cyclical fiscal policy as indicated by the results reported in the third and fourth column 
of Table 4. The occurrence of tax revenue shortfall, however, yield mixed results and coefficients 
on the OG variable which are never significant. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using information about fiscal plans taken from the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCP) 
we analyse the size and potential causes of governments' revenues windfall in the European 
Union.  Unexpected changes in tax revenues varied substantially both across time with some EU 
Member States alternating large tax windfalls in 2005-2007 with substantial shortfalls in 2008, as 
for instance Spain (1.06% in 2005-2007 vs. -4.57% in 2008) and Ireland (1.15% in 2005-2007 vs.  
-4.30% in 2008). When considering potential determinants of these unexpected swings in tax 
revenues, growth surprises and GDP growth composition effects (although only indirectly through 
their correlation with growth surprise) are found to play the most significant (and positive) role. In 
certain cases, however, asset prices evolutions (in particular for countries such as Ireland, the UK, 
Spain and Finland) are found to also exert a significant influence on tax revenues surprise. In the 
sequel we provide some evidence on the incidence of these tax revenues' surprises on the ability 
of government to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policies which are desirable from a 
macroeconomic perspective. We find that countries that have experienced the largest revenue 
windfalls in the UE during the period 1999-2008 have also tended to run more pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies, although the significance of these results varies depending on the method used to 
calculate cyclically adjusted primary balance and on the use of ex-post or real-time data. Overall 
these results suggest that: (1) The assessment and identification of past revenue 
windfalls/shortfalls should be improved in the context of the EU fiscal framework in particular by 
  19making use of information contained in the SCPs concerning differences between plans and 
outcomes and possibly by complementing it with more detailed country-specific information on 
the transitory/permanent nature of recent tax revenues developments (2) Past revenues 
windfalls/shortfall should be considered when assessing countries' fiscal stance and in particular 
to gauge the ability of governments to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policies as our results 
suggest in particular that past tax revenue windfalls occurring during expansionary phase can 
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  21Tables 
 
Table 1: Governments' unexpected changes in tax revenues in the EU25 
in % of GDP, 1999-2008 
  1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008 
AT  0.10 0.09 0.35  0.77 
BE  0.26 0.30 0.11  -0.59 
CY     3.04  1.70 
CZ     0.37  0.43 
DE 0.73  -0.73  0.64  0.47 
DK -0.28  0.89  0.65  1.07 
EE     0.25  -4.89 
EL  -0.05 -0.73 -0.25  -1.57 
ES  0.05 0.07 1.06  -4.57 
FI  0.33 1.06 0.63  1.40 
FR 0.37  -0.05  0.10  -0.44 
HU     1.52  -0.18 
IE -0.10  0.61  1.15  -4.30 
IT 0.12  -0.38  0.85  -1.27 
LT     -0.18  -1.98 
LU 2.18  -0.24  -0.01  2.06 
LV     -0.92  -5.08 
MT     -0.38  -0.10 
NL  0.49 0.64 0.46  0.95 
PL     0.63  -0.18 
PT -1.23  0.12  1.02  -0.17 
SE  0.51 0.78 1.27  3.41 
SI     0.27  1.51 
SK     -0.43  0.08 
UK 0.30  -0.91  -0.41  0.95 
Average euro-area*  0.35 -0.22 0.56  -0.72 
average EU15*  0.33 -0.29 0.40  -0.31 
average RAMS*     0.66  -0.23 
average EU25*     0.41  -0.30 
std. dev. Euro-area*  0.64 0.68 0.63  1.78 
std. dev. EU15*  0.94 0.88 0.93  1.83 
std. dev. RAMS*   1.66  1.30   
std. dev. EU25*     1.25  1.78 
 
 
Sources: Commission services, Stability and convergence programmes 
and Ameco. (*) weighted (GDP) figures. 





3 Table 3: Estimations of fiscal reaction functions for the EU15, 1999-2008 















CABi,t-1  -0.420*** -0.429***  -0.542*** -0.538***  -0.645*** -0.404*** 
  (0.080) (0.078)  (0.085)  (0.082)  (0.121) (0.073) 
Bi,t-1  0.085*** 0.064**  0.088***  0.089*** 0.095***  0.097*** 
  (0.025) (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.031) (0.023) 
OGi,t-1  -0.111          
(ex-post, PF method)  (0.114)          
OGi,t-1   -0.254***         
(ex-post, HP method)   (0.093)         
OGi,t-1     0.044    0.434*   
(real-time, PF method)     (0.145)    (0.232)   
OGi,t-1       0.051    -0.118 
(real-time, HP method)       (0.160)    (0.133) 
           
Constant  -4.698*** -3.605**  -4.093*** -4.169***  -2.560 -3.619*** 
  (1.418) (1.497)  (1.555)  (1.529)  (1.842) (1.329) 
           
           
Observations  135 135  118  118 88  118 
Number of group 
(country) 
15 15  15  15  15 15 
R-squared  0.25 0.27  0.36  0.36  0.37 0.34 
F test for fixed effects  2.70 2.45  3.64  3.63  2.81 2.83 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
  24Table 4: Fiscal policy and the business cycle for given values of tax revenues surprises in the 
EU15, 1999-2008* 
 
  Tax windfall  Neutral tax revenue change  Tax shortfall 
  sd(1) sd(2) sd(1)  sd(2) sd(1)  sd(2) 
OGi,t-1 























































OGi,t-1 and ΔCAPB 













OGi,t-1 and ΔCAPB 













* Estimation based on Aitken and West (1991) method, centered (mean) values of the variables. sd(1) and sd(2) 
indicate that estimations are made on the one and two-standard deviation of the (centered) value of the tax revenue 
surprise variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 
  25Graph 1: Governments' revenue windfalls and shortfalls in the EU, 1999-2008 
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Note: weighted (GDP) averages 
Sources: Commission services, Stability and convergence programmes and Ameco 
 





8Graph 4: Change in the cyclically adjusted balance, output gap 

































OG < 0 OG > 0 OG < 0 OG > 0 OG < 0 OG > 0
 
Source: Commission services, Stability and convergence 
programmes and Ameco  
  29Graph 5: Change in the cyclically adjusted balance, output gap 






























OG < 0 OG > 0 OG < 0 OG > 0 OG < 0 OG > 0
 
Source: Commission services, Stability and convergence 
programmes and Ameco  
  30Graph 6: Change in the cyclically adjusted balance, output gap 

































OG < 0 OG > 0 OG < 0 OG > 0 OG < 0 OG > 0
 
Source: Commission services, Stability and convergence programmes and Ameco 
  31Annex 1: Interpreting interaction coefficient between revenue surprises and output gap 
 
Equation (5) is tested including an interaction term between the output gap (OGit) and the lagged 
revenue windfall variable. As shown in Aitken and West (1991) the coefficient on the interacted 
variable can be interpreted at given levels of the conditioning variable using simple 
transformations of the estimated coefficients on the centered variables. Standard errors can also 
be easily choosing the appropriate terms in the variance-covariance matrix. Given that variables 
are centered the benchmark for interpreting the values of the estimated coefficient is zero. Aiten 
and West therefore suggest to consider deviations from this benchmark given by the value of the 
standard deviation of the conditioning variable. For instance, when estimating equation (5) one 
can estimate the coefficient β5 below (for simplicity we omit the subscripts and the other variables 
although these are also included in the estimations) 
 
ΔCAPB = β0 +  β1 OG + β2 RS+ β3 (O G   *   R S )          ( A 1 )  
 
Where RS denotes the revenue surprise as calculated in (1). The terms in (A1) can be rearranged 
the following way: 
 
ΔCAPB = (β0 + β2 RS) + (β1 + β3 RS) O G        ( A 2 )  
 
Equation (A2) thus indicates that the slope of the regression of ΔCAPBi,t on OG i,t-1 and depends 
upon the particular value of RSi,t-1 at which the slope is considered. Different values of RS can be 
chosen. A standard practice is to just consider one standard deviation of the centered data which 
in the present case represents a value of RS equal to 0.009, i.e., 0.9 percentage points of GDP. 
Alternatively, we also try out our estimation using this value multiplied by 2, i.e., 1.8 pp of GDP. 




13 11 2 s RS RSs s sb + + =                            (A3) 
 
where the values s11 and s33 are the variances of β1 and β3 and s13 is the covariance between β1 and 
β3 taken from the sample estimate of the variance-covariance matrix. One can then obtain 
different estimates of the interaction term (and their corresponding standard errors) for different 
values of RS.  The t-test for whether a simple slope differs from zero is simply the value of the 
slope divided by its standard deviation with n-k-1 degrees of freedom, where n is the total number 
of observations and k the number of explanatory variables 
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